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Abstract. We conduct laboratory experiments where the market
rules mimic labor market institutions, and exogenously vary insti-
tutions to study the causal impact on subjects’ behaviors. We focus
on rules analogous to dismissal barrier institutions, such as employ-
ment protection legislation, and on institutions allowing bonus pay.
We find that when constrained to fixed wage contracts, dismissal
barriers reduce efficiency, but parties react by evolving rising com-
pensation profiles. When the option to pay bonuses is introduced
this completely offsets the negative effects of dismissal barriers. In
the absence of dismissal barriers, bonus pay reduces frequency of
repeated interactions, but leaves market efficiency unchanged.
1. Introduction
All countries have labor market institutions that constrain the in-
centive options available to firms, to varying degrees. Establishing the
causal impact of such institutions on market performance, and on the
types of incentive strategies that may emerge, is notoriously problem-
atic due to the likely endogeneity of institutions (Falk and Huffman
(2007)). This paper reports the results from laboratory experiments
*We are grateful for helpful comments from seminar participants at IZA Bonn,
the University of Zurich, Columbia University, the NBER summer institute, the
Wharton School of Business, the editor, Paul Oyer and the anonymous referees.
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in the spirit of the gift exchange game (see Fehr et al., 1993Fehr et al.
(1993)). We modify market rules to mimic features of important labor
market institutions, and manipulate these to study the causal effects
on behavior.
At one extreme we consider rules for our experimental markets that
mimic dismissal barrier institutions, which may arise in real world
labor markets due to employment protection legislation (Autor et al.
(2007)),1 and we also restrict contracts to involve binding, up-front
compensation (fixed wages). At the other end of the spectrum we
consider markets where there are no constraints on firing, and also
introduce the additional flexibility to use bonus pay. Bonus pay is
an increasingly important feature of labor market institutions (Oyer
(2004); Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2009)), but implications for
market functioning are not fully understood.
In our experiments we randomly assigned student subjects to roles,
labeled neutrally in the instructions as buyers or sellers. In terms of the
payoff functions and possible actions implemented in the experiments,
the former are analogous to (single proprietor) “firms” buying “effort”
for “wages”, and the latter to “workers” selling effort; henceforth, we
use these labels to indicate the roles and actions of subjects in our
experiments. Subjects who were firms could make contract offers to
workers. A firm’s payoffs were increasing in an “effort number” chosen
by an employed worker, and decreasing in the compensation they paid
the worker. For workers, payoffs were increasing with wages, but de-
creasing with the choice of higher effort numbers. Effort was observable
to the firm but not contractable, corresponding to non-verifiability to
third parties.2 Firms and workers had the possibility to endogenously
engage in repeated interactions over the course of the 18 period exper-
imental game.
In experimental markets with the dismissal barrier institution, a firm
lost the option to “fire” a worker for the rest of the game, if at any point
the firm chose to re-hire the same worker beyond an initial probation
period. Wages were also downwardly rigid, to prevent de facto firing.
The second institution, bonus pay, allowed firms the flexibility to pay
performance contingent bonuses at the end of each period of the game,
after observing worker effort choices. Like effort, bonuses were not
enforceable.
1Barriers can also arise due to relationship-specific investments or due to
relationship-specific investments (Mincer (1962))
2Non-verifiability is a pervasive feature of employment relationships. See
Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975) for a classic early study.
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We find that in experimental markets where contracts are constrained
to involve only fixed wages, dismissal barriers reduce efficiency, al-
though parties react to the constraints by endogenously evolving incen-
tives based on rising wage profiles. When the option to pay bonuses is
introduced this completely offsets the negative effects of dismissal bar-
riers. In the absence of dismissal barriers, bonus pay reduces frequency
of repeated interactions, but leaves market efficiency unchanged.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the
relationship of this work to the literature. Section 3 describes the design
of the experiment, Sections 4 and 5 present the empirical analysis, and
Section 6 concludes.
2. Previous Literature
For the class of games we explore existing theory provides limited
guidance. If we suppose that individuals are expected income maxi-
mizers, then we know the equilibrium is highly inefficient. Kreps et al.
(1982) introduced a game theoretic model with asymmetric information
that was designed to produce equilibria involving non-minimal cooper-
ation, despite a finite horizon. This type of model is very complex and
there are an unlimited number of ways to generate this type of result.
One thing we do know is that the introduction of bonus pay can have
large effects upon the structure of market equilibria.3 This literature
suggests a need for more empirical evidence in order to understand
behavior in these complex markets.4
It is a long-standing policy question how dismissal barrier insti-
tutions affect market performance. Lazear (1990) argued that there
would be no consequence for match quality since starting wages could
be adjusted to compensate for separation costs. Such a contract does
not, however, deal with the potential adverse incentive effects in the
case that work effort is non-verifiable. Our experiments speak to this
latter issue by making some of the actions of the trading parties not
contractually enforceable.
Previous laboratory experiments have found that bonus contracts
outperform wage contracts (e.g., Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger(1997),
3See, e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson (1998).
4There is a rich theoretical literature showing that a number of strategies can be
used to enhance performance with incomplete employment contracts, including ris-
ing wage profiles (Lazear (1979)), efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)),
subjective bonus pay (MacLeod and Malcomson (1998)) and contractible bonuses
(Baker, Gibbons and Murphy(1994)). A key question is: which strategy will ac-
tually emerge, and under what conditions? This paper focuses on the potential
determining role of institutions.
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Gneezy (2006), and Fehr, Klein and Schmidt(2007)), but have mainly
been restricted to one-shot settings. In our repeated-interaction set-
ting, where wages can be complemented with firing threat, we find
that wage contracts perform about as well as contracts involving bonus
pay. At the same time, bonus pay leads to less reliance on relational
contracting and shorter employment duration, qualifying previous lab-
oratory findings that non-verifiable effort necessarily leads to long re-
lationships (Brown, Falk and Fehr(2004)). Huck et al. (2011) show
that rising wage incentives work better when firms can commit to a
given profile. Our study differs by investigating how the prevalence of
rising wage profiles depends on the presence of dismissal barriers, and
comparing their performance relative to other incentive strategies.
There is a literature showing that bonus pay is associated with
longer employment relationships. Weitzman (1983) explicitly argues
that bonus pay in the form of profit sharing can extend the duration of
relationships. Oyer (2004) and more recently Lemieux, MacLeod and
Parent (2012) find that bonus pay is associated with fewer layoffs. An
open question, however, is whether or not bonus pay causes a reduc-
tion in layoff rates. There can be a number of reasons why jobs with
bonus pay have lower layoff rates, including the possibility that such
incentives are adopted endogenously in matches that are long-lasting
due to more relationship specific investments.5 The results of our labo-
ratory experiments illustrate how the causal impact of bonus pay could
actually be to reduce relationship length.
As we discuss in the conclusion of the paper, the empirical literature
on the impact of employment protection legislation has found mixed
or weak evidence. Our experiments help shed light on some potential
reasons why, showing how, in the spirit of Coase, it may take only a
small degree of additional contractual flexibility for market participants
to contract around the distortions caused by institutions.
3. The Experiment
3.1. Basic setup. The experimental game involved 18 trading peri-
ods. Subjects were randomly assigned to the role of a firm or worker.
In each period a firm could hire at most one worker, and a worker could
have at most one job. A period involved two or three main phases, de-
pending on the treatment.
A period began with theMarket Phase, in which firms made contract
offers and workers could only accept or reject. Firms could make as
many contract offers as they wanted during the time limit of three
5See, e.g., (Lemieux et al. (2009)).
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minutes; if one of a firm’s contracts was accepted, all of the other offers
by that firm were immediately removed from the market.6 Contract
offers consisted of a wage, w, a desired effort level, e˜, and in some
treatments an offered bonus, b˜. The offer also included the firm’s ID
number.
Firms could make two types of contract offers during the market
phase. “Public offers” were observed by all workers, and thus could be
accepted by any worker. “Private offers” were observed only by a worker
specified by the firm, and thus were available only to that particular
worker. In the case that a firm made a private offer, the firm specified
a worker’s ID number, in addition to the contract terms. Worker and
firm ID numbers remained constant over the entire 18 periods. This
design made it possible for a firm and worker to endogenously form
a long-term relationship, by choosing to repeatedly engage in private-
offer contracts with each other. Public offers were a way for firms to
engage in a spot market for labor. During the market phase, firms were
kept constantly informed about which workers had already accepted a
contract, so as to avoid having firms make a private offer to a worker
that was no longer available.
A second phase, the Effort Phase, was entered by firms and workers
that agreed on a contract at the conclusion of the market phase. In
this phase the worker could decide how much effort, e to exert, where
effort was a number from 1 to 10 as described in more detail below. Im-
portantly, the desired effort in the contract was not binding, to mimic
a setting in which effort is non-verifiable to third parties (e.g., third
parties being legal courts).
In treatments where the contract offer could include an offered bonus,
there was a third phase, the Bonus Phase, in which the firm was in-
formed about the worker’s effort choice and could decide how much
of a bonus, b, to pay. Importantly, neither the worker’s effort level or
the firm’s bonus payment were restricted by the initial contract agree-
ment, whereas a wage specified in the agreement was binding. After
the second (third) phase, the firm and worker were informed about
their profits and earnings, respectively, and then a new period began.
The experiment used neutral framing (e.g., “buyers”, “sellers”, and
“quality”) to help ensure that if subjects act like workers and firms, it
is due to the implemented incentives, rather than a perception that the
6The market phase was designed to end automatically after three minutes, or after
the last firm had a contract offer accepted, whichever came first.
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experimenter expects them to act like workers and firms.7 Representa-
tive instructions are provided in an online appendix.
3.2. Treatments and the dismissal barrier institution. In total
we have four treatments: The treatment T-Baseline provides a bench-
mark, of a wage contract setting without dismissal barriers;8 contracts
consisted of a binding wage, w, and a desired effort level, e˜. In T-
Barrier the contract options were the same, consisting of w and e˜, but
there was also a dismissal barrier institution, described in more detail
below. In the treatment T-Barrier-Bonus, the dismissal barrier institu-
tion was in effect, but firms had the option to offer a (non-enforceable)
bonus, b˜, in addition to a wage and desired effort. Finally, we had
T-Bonus, which included the bonus option but no dismissal barriers,
with contracts consisting of w, e˜, and b˜.
Dismissal barrier institution: In experimental markets with dis-
missal barriers, a firm lost the ability to fire a worker in the case that
in two consecutive periods the worker had accepted a private offer from
that firm.9 The fact that the dismissal barrier was activated only with
the second consecutive contract has an analogue in situations where
relationship-specific investments are made only after some time has
elapsed, or in the case of employment protection legislation, which of-
ten specifies an initial probation period.
Once the dismissal barrier took effect the firm had to make an offer
to that same worker at the beginning of each subsequent period until
the end of the game or until the worker decided to reject the firm’s
offer. Firms chose the terms of these offers in a special phase before the
market phase. The wage offer always had to be at least as high as in the
previous period. Some rigidity of the wage is required for a dismissal
protection institution to work, otherwise a firm could effectively fire
a worker by reducing the wage to zero.10 After firms had determined
their offers required by the dismissal barrier institution, the market
period began and workers protected by the dismissal barrier could see
the standing offer from their own firm, in addition to the other market
7This framing was also used by, e.g., Brown et al. (2004). Across the literature
there is no strong evidence that choice of framing matters for this class of games.
8The ICF treatment in Brown et al. (2004) was similar, except that it lasted only
15 periods. Our T-Baseline extends the market game to 18 periods.
9Disallowing firing, as opposed to introducing an additional parameter capturing
a finite cost of firing, has the advantage of simplifying an already complex choice
situation. It also provides a particularly tough test of the ability of bonus pay to
overcome the effects of dismissal barriers.
10This is known as constructive dismissal, and is considered illegal in any jurisdic-
tion with employment protection. See Black’s Law Dictionary.
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activity. At any time, the worker could accept the standing offer, in
which case the firm was informed. Alternatively, the worker could
accept another contract in the market. As soon as the worker rejected
the standing offer, the firm was informed, and allowed to make offers
during the remainder of the market phase.
3.3. Parameters, Information Conditions, Procedure, and Sub-
ject Pool. All market sessions lasted 18 periods, and had 7 firms and
10 workers. The material payoff to a firm was given by the function
(3.1) pif =
{
10 · e− w − b if a contract offer was accepted
0 if no contract offer was accepted
and the payoff function for a worker was given by
(3.2) piw =
{
w + b− c(e) if a contract offer was accepted
5 if no contract offer was accepted
where c(e) was a cost of effort function, and 5 was the unemployment
benefit in the case that a worker did not engage in a trade. The wage,
the offered bonus, and the bonus actually paid, b, could each take on an
integer value 0, 1, 2, ...100. The desired effort level and the actual effort
level chosen by the worker, e, could take on integer values 1, 2, ..., 10.
The effort cost function (Table 1) is increasing and convex. Because
the marginal cost of effort is at most 3, while the marginal benefit is
always 10, the efficient effort level is 10.11
Table 1: Effort cost schedule
Effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
The length of the game, and all payoff functions, including the effort
cost function, were common knowledge. Firms learned about the ef-
fort choices only of workers that they traded with, and workers learned
about the bonus decisions only of firms that they personally encoun-
tered, reflecting non-verifiability to third parties. Firms observed all
11Using numerical rather than “real effort” allows holding effort costs constant across
workers. One could have an optimal effort at the interior, but then it would not be
possible to disentangle empirically incentives to reduce effort from errors in setting
effort.
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public offers on the market during the market phase. Workers were in-
formed not only about private offers they had received, but also about
all public offers on the market.
At the end of each period, a subject’s period profits were summa-
rized, along with the profits of the trading partner in the case of a
trade. Subjects were also reminded of the partner’s ID number, the
terms of the initial contract, the actual effort choice, and the actual
bonus paid. Subjects recorded this information on a separate sheet
of paper, ensuring that subjects were fully informed about their own
trading history over the course of the experiment.12
The experiment was computerized using Z-Tree software (Fischbacher
(2007)). There were 408 participants in the experiment. We conducted
six market sessions for each of the four treatments. Subjects were stu-
dents at the University of Bonn, from various fields of study. Recruiting
was done using ORSEE (Greiner (2003)). No subject participated in
more than one session. On average, a session lasted roughly 100 min-
utes, and a subject earned 25 Euros (approximately 32 USD).
A notable feature of our experimental setting is the finite horizon. If
material selfishness is common knowledge, standard backwards induc-
tion arguments imply low effort and compensation levels in all periods
in all treatments. Thus, the variation in institutions should have no
impact on market outcomes. It is well established based on experimen-
tal evidence, however, that material selfishness does not fully describe
the motivations of all agents, and that there is typically a substantial
fraction who are motivated by fairness concerns (see, e.g., Fehr et al.
(2007)). As is well known, the presence of a sufficient number of fair
individuals can in principle lead to greater cooperation than the sub-
game perfect prediction (e.g., Kreps et al. (1982)). For example, in
T-Barrier and T-Baseline, workers are the final movers; if some work-
ers will exert non-minimal effort even in the final period of the game,
in response to generous fixed wages, this could facilitate establishing
incentives for selfish workers in earlier periods, because firms can of-
fer the possibility of a final-period rent.13 In the other treatments,
T-Barrier-Bonus and T-Bonus, fairness concerns on the part of firms
can make bonus payments credible in the final period, providing a rent
to motivate workers. Given that incentives may be possible, the varia-
tion in institutions across treatments could affect market performance,
12There was an unpaid practice period before the experiment began, which con-
sisted only of a market phase but not the subsequent effort or bonus phases, to give
subjects experience with the process of making and accepting offers.
13See also MacLeod (2007) for a discussion of how final period rents allow obtaining
performance that is close to the first best in earlier periods.
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because they constrain the incentive strategies available to firms to
varying degrees.
4. Results on Aggregate Outcomes
We begin our analysis by studying the impact of varying market
rules on several aspects of aggregate performance in our experimental
markets. We calculate efficiency of a trade as the ratio of the surplus
generated relative to the maximum possible surplus, and study the
impact of institutions on average efficiency per trade.14 Firm profits
and worker earnings are both normalized by maximum possible profits,
and earnings in a trade, respectively. Length is the ultimate length of
a relationship, where public offers are coded as having a length of 1.
Table 2 has three panels, where the regression results in each panel
have a different treatment as the omitted category.15 Panel A shows
that efficiency and firm profits in T-Barrier are both significantly lower
than in T-Baseline, by 12 and 9 percentage points, respectively. Dis-
missal barriers have no significant impact on worker payoffs, or rela-
tionship length, relative to T-Baseline.
Result 1: Introducing dismissal barriers into a wage contract setting
reduces efficiency and firm profits, without improving payoffs for work-
ers or changing average relationship length.
In Column (1) of Panel B we see that efficiency in T-Barrier-Bonus
is 10 percentage points higher than in T-Barrier, as are firm profits.
By contrast, efficiency and firm profits in T-Barrier-Bonus are both
within 1 percentage point of the corresponding outcomes in T-Baseline
(Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A). Worker outcomes, and average relation-
ship length, are unchanged with respect to T-Barrier and T-Baseline.
Result 2: Adding bonus pay to a setting with dismissal barriers almost
eliminates the losses in efficiency and profits, and does not affect worker
payoffs or relationship lengths.
14The maximum possible surplus in a trade is generated by an effort level of 10.
Maximum surplus equals: 10 ∗ 10− 18− 5 = 77.
15Estimates account for individual differences (random effects), and standard errors
are adjusted to allow for correlation of the error term across observations from the
same market session. Results are similar if we instead use session averages, instead
of clustering, or simply use OLS without random effects and clustering. Subsequent
regressions in the rest of the paper use a similar adjustment.
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Table 3: Aggregate treatment effects
Panel A: T-Baseline Omitted Panel B: T-Barrier Omitted
Efficiency Firm Worker Length Efficiency Firm Worker Length
profits payoffs profits payoffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
T-Barrier -0.12∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.03 0.18
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (1.54)
T-Barrier-Bonus -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.87 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.01 -1.05
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.54) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (1.23)
T-Baseline 0.12∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.03 -0.18
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (1.54)
T-Bonus 0.05 0.10∗∗∗ -0.05 -3.03∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ -0.02 -3.20∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (1.25) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (1.03)
Constant 0.64∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 6.19∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 6.37∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (1.20) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.96)
Obs. 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015 3015
Panel C: T-Barrier-Bonus Omitted
Efficiency Firm Worker Length
profits payoffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T-Barrier -0.10∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.01 1.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (1.23)
T-Barrier-Bonus
T-Baseline 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.87
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (1.42)
T-Bonus 0.06∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ -0.02 -2.16∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.85)
Constant 0.63∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 5.32∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.76)
Obs. 3015 3015 3015 3015
Notes: Random effects estimates at the firm level, robust standard errors in brackets
adjusted for clustering on sessions. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗indicate significance at the 1-, 5-,
and 10-percent level, respectively.
To identify the impact of bonus pay per se, we need T-Bonus. Col-
umn (1) of Panel A shows that bonus pay leads to a 5 percentage point
increase in efficiency, relative to T-Baseline, but the difference is not
statistically significant. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel C show that effi-
ciency and firm profits are significantly higher in T-Bonus compared to
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T-Barrier-Bonus. Thus, dismissal barriers do harm efficiency even with
bonus pay, relative to the benchmark of bonus pay and no barriers, but
only by about 6 percentage points. Firm profits are 9 percentage points
higher in T-Bonus than in T-Barrier-Bonus. We also see in Column (4)
of Panels A, B, and C that average relationship length is substantially
lower in T-Bonus than in T-Baseline, T-Barrier, or T-Barrier-Bonus,
although the magnitude is greater in the former comparison.
Result 3: Bonus pay per se, in the absence of dismissal barriers,
has little impact on efficiency. The highest firm profits, and also the
shortest relationship lengths, are observed in a market with bonus pay
but no barriers.
5. Contract Enforcement strategies at the micro level
In this section we discuss how variation in market rules affected
micro-level behavior of subjects in the role of firms, which in turn sheds
light on mechanism underlying differences in aggregate outcomes. We
do not provide detailed analysis of worker effort choices, for the sake of
brevity and because average effort levels are already largely captured
by aggregate market efficiency.16 We organize the analysis by type of
contract enforcement strategy.
5.1. Incentives based on rising compensation profiles. Figure
1 shows compensation profiles over the course of long-term relation-
ships in all treatments. Looking at T-Barrier, we see that firms tend
to implement an increasing wage profile on average, with the largest
increases saved till the last few periods. This is true in the left-hand
panel of the figure, which includes all contracts in long-term relation-
ships; the total increase in the average wage is 43 percent, from the
second period when barriers become active, to the final period. We
also see a similar pattern in the right-hand panel, which focuses only
on the 50 percent or more of relationships that were truly long-lasting,
16In our experimental setup effort is essentially a sufficient statistic for efficiency.
The only discrepancy arises in the rare case that a firm does not find a worker to
accept a contract, in which case effort is not defined.
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in that they continued for at least 12 periods.17 The profile is essen-
tially unchanged by exclusion of short-lived relationships, with a wage
increase of about 42 percent.
Turning to the other three treatments, Figure 1 shows that com-
pensation levels are substantially higher than in T-Barrier throughout
long-term relationships. The lower levels of compensation in T-Barrier
explain why workers in long-term relationships are not better off than
in other treatments, despite being protected from firing. While there is
a positive slope for T-Barrier-Bonus, T-Baseline, and T-Bonus in the
left-hand panel, this upward sloping relationship is misleading because
short-lived relationships tend to have lower compensation levels in these
treatments. In the right-hand panel, where this composition effect is
eliminated, we see that compensation profiles are actually constant.18
Regression analysis shows that compensation levels are significantly
lower in T-Barrier than T-Baseline for all long-term relationships (p <
0.01), and considering only relationships lasting at least 12 periods
17We see 82.6 percent of longterm relationships lasting longer than 12 periods in
T-Barrier, and about 50 percent of long-term relationships achieving this length in
each of the other three treatments.
18We find similar results using other natural relationship-length cut-offs, for exam-
ple, considering all relationships lasting at least 9 periods, i.e., half of the market
game.
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(p < 0.01). Also, there is a positive relationship between relationship
period and compensation level in T-Barrier, which is significantly larger
than in T-Baseline both for all long-term (p < 0.01), and long-lasting
long-term relationships (p < 0.01).19 Profiles in T-Barrier-Bonus and
T-Bonus are not significantly different than in T-Baseline, and the
correlation between relationship period and compensation level is no
longer statistically significant for these treatments considering truly
long-lasting relationships. Thus, a rising wage profile during long-term
relationships is mainly observed in a setting with wage contracts and
dismissal barriers.
For the rising wage profile in T-Barrier to provide incentives, wage in-
creases must be conditioned on good performance. A Probit regression
shows that good worker performance in the previous period has a sig-
nificant positive impact on the likelihood of a wage increase (p < 0.01)
in T-Barrier, controlling for the wage level and desired effort in the
previous period. By contrast, there is not a positive and significant
relationship for the other three treatments.
Notably, the motivating power of rising wage profiles in T-Barrier
appears to be relatively weak, compared to the alternative strategies
used in other treatments; lower aggregate effort levels in T-Barrier are
driven entirely by lower effort levels within long-term relationships,
and we observe a large, within-worker drop in effort in T-Barrier once
dismissal barriers are triggered and prevent firing; this large drop is
not present in other treatments.20
5.2. Incentives based on bonus pay. In T-Barrier-Bonus we see
that 98 percent of all contracts involve a positive offered bonus, and
as shown in Figure 2, firms use the bonus to reward high effort. A
regression of actual bonus on worker effort, controlling for wage and
19The independent variables in this regression include: treatment dummies, re-
lationship period, and interactions of treatments with relationship period. The
coefficient on Relationship period shows a weaker correlation between relationship
period and compensation level in T-Baseline, while the interaction terms T-Barrier-
Bonus*Relationship period and T-Bonus*Relationship period are not statistically
significant. We confirm robustness to including previous effort as a control as this
is likely to be an important determinant of current compensation level, particularly
in T-Barrier. Below, we discuss in detail the conditioning of wage increases on
performance in the various treatments. Results are also robust to controlling for
contract terms, and a dummy for final market period.
20Probit regressions show that the probability of an effort drop going from the first
to second relationship period is significantly higher in T-Barrier than in T-Baseline,
by 30 percent (p < 0.01). The results are robust to controlling for contract terms
in the previous (first) relationship period, and for market period. There is no
significant difference for T-Barrier-Bonus and T-Bonus with respect to T-Baseline.
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desired effort, shows that this positive relationship is highly significant
(p < 0.01).21 Notably, average bonus payments are sufficient to cover
worker effort costs, for a given effort level. We now see that firms in
T-Barrier-Bonus used an alternative incentive strategy to rising com-
pensation profiles, namely bonus reductions to discipline shirkers, with
better results in terms of aggregate effort and efficiency (Table 2).
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In T-Bonus 97 percent of contracts involve a positive offered bonus,
and as shown in Figure 2 firms reward high effort with high bonuses
(p < 0.01). We also see in Figure 2, however, that firms are able to
pay a lower level of actual bonus in T-Bonus than T-Barrier-Bonus,
while achieving just as good performance by workers. We explore this
pattern in more detail using regressions, pooling data from T-Barrier-
Bonus, and T-Bonus. Considering only contracts that were part of
long-term relationships, we find that offered bonuses are significantly
lower in T-Bonus than T-Barrier (p < 0.01), while for initial/one-shot
interactions the treatment difference is actually negative and far from
significant.22 The fact that the difference is restricted to long-term
relationships suggests that it reflects the ability to also rely on firing
21This credibility breaks down somewhat in the final market period: In the final
period 54 percent of firms pay a zero bonus, despite a positive offered bonus and the
worker choosing the requested effort level, whereas this fraction is 5 percent taking
all pre-final periods together. However, the remaining 46 percent of firms do pay a
bonus in the final period, consistent with some firms having fairness concerns.
22The results are robust to controlling for wage and desired effort, as well as a
dummy for final market period. Similar regressions, with actual bonus as the
dependent variable, and effort included as an independent variable, show that actual
bonuses were also significantly lower in T-Bonus than T-Barrier-Bonus. Including
offered bonuses, the treatment dummy becomes significant, indicating that the
14
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Notes: Sample includes private offer contracts
in period t. Termination occurs if a firm does
not make a private offer to the worker in t+1.
Final market period is excluded.
threat in such cases, which is not possible in T-Barrier-Bonus. We show
below that firms in T-Bonus do, indeed, use both bonus incentives and
firing threat, explaining how they can offer lower bonus payments in
long-term relationships, and yet achieve the same or higher effort levels
compared to in T-Barrier-Bonus.
5.3. Incentives based on firing threat. In T-Baseline and T-Bonus,
firms can use firing threat as an incentive device. Figure 3 reveals that
firms in T-Baseline condition relationship continuation strongly on past
performance of the worker. A Probit regression also shows that the
probability of termination decreases significantly with higher previous
period effort by the worker (p < 0.01).
For firing threat to provide incentives, it is also necessary that work-
ers earn a rent by staying employed. This is the case in T-Baseline, as
workers in renewed private offer contracts earn 48.28 on average, com-
pared to 29.25 in public offer contracts, or 5 from being unemployed,
so that even taking into account effort costs workers are much better
off receiving a private offer.23 Thus, firing imposes a cost on workers
difference in actual bonuses was reflected in the initial contract offer. Thus, firms
had to offer, and pay, higher bonuses for a given effort level in T-Barrier-Bonus,
but only in long-term relationships where firing threat was eliminated.
23A similar picture emerges when one considers the expected total future rents,
conditional on being hired with a private offer in a given market period. For each
period t we calculate a proxy for total rents by summing up current and future
15
in the form of foregone rents. Notably, relationships that start with
high wages initially in T-Baseline are significantly more likely to have
high effort, and to be long-lived.24 This suggests the importance, in a
wage contract setting, of offering high wages already at the beginning
of relationships, for a successful relationship.
Figure 3 shows that firms in T-Bonus also use firing threat as an
incentive device, in addition to bonus pay. Workers who are hired
with a private offer earn rents relative to the case of being unemployed
(or having a public offer contract), making firing a meaningful punish-
ment.25 It is apparent from Figure 3, however, that the conditioning
of firing on performance is weaker in T-Bonus than in T-Baseline. A
Probit regression shows that the negative relationship between effort
and probability of termination is statistically significant in T-Bonus
(p < 0.01), but that the slope is significantly flatter than in T-Baseline
(p < 0.01). Not only are relational incentives weaker in T-Bonus, in
the sense that termination is less closely linked to performance, but
termination is generally more likely in T-Bonus, by about 23 percent-
age points on average across all effort levels (p < 0.01).26 Thus, shorter
relationships in T-Bonus are due to a change in incentive strategy.
5.4. Incentives based on cutting wages. In principle firms in T-
Baseline and T-Bonus could provide incentives by re-hiring workers
who shirked but penalizing them with a temporary reduction in wages
in the next period. This strategy is essentially never used, however.
Out of all cases in T-Baseline and T-Bonus where a worker is in a
long-term relationship and shirks, firms use a strategy of re-hiring the
worker and reducing offered wages in only 6 percent of cases, and 3
earnings, from t to T = 18, for all workers who are in a private offer contract in
period t. We compare the average of this value for a given period, denoted Vpriv,
to the average current and future earnings of workers who are in a public offer
contract in the same period, and workers who are unemployed, denoted Vpub and
Vu, respectively. The differences Vpriv − Vpub and Vpriv − Vu are positive in every
market period.
24The difference is apparent even in the very first period of relationships: regressing
effort on initial wage level shows that a 10 unit increase in the wage increases average
effort over the course of the relationship by more than 1 unit (random effects; robust
s.e., clustering on session; p < 0.01).
25Similar to T-Baseline, expected future rents, conditional on being employed in a
given period with a private offer, always exceeded workers’ outside option in every
period.
26These results are from a Probit regression. Independent variables include effort,
a treatment dummy for T-Bonus, and an interaction term between T-Bonus and
effort. The significance of firing threat incentives is shown by a joint test of the
significance of treatment dummy and interaction term.
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percent of cases, respectively. Interestingly, there is some evidence
that cutting wages compensation even has a deleterious effect on sub-
sequent worker performance, which could explain why firms seldom use
this strategy. Probit regressions show that a drop in offered wages is
associated with a significantly higher probability of worker shirking,
in both treatments(p < 0.01; p < 0.01). This is true controlling for
current offered wages, so it is the unfavorable relative comparison to
previous compensation that is associated with an increased likelihood
to shirk.27
Result 4: Rising wage incentives are observed primarily when firms
face dismissal barriers and no bonus option; with firing threat or bonus
pay as options, these are used instead. Bonus pay causes firms to dis-
miss workers more frequently and condition re-hiring less strongly on
performance.
5.5. Discussion. One question raised by our results is: Why are ris-
ing wage incentives not more effective? Part of the answer may be
the lower compensation over long-term relationships, observed in T-
Barrier (see Figure 2).28 Low levels of compensation may lead to low
27The regressions also control for desired effort in the previous and current period,
and current and previous offered bonus in the case of T-Bonus. Similar results are
obtained using a drop in the level of effort, rather than shirking, as the dependent
variable.
28From a game theoretic viewpoint, it is understandable why firms pay relatively
low compensation in T-Barrier. Going into the final period, firms have no incentive
motive to actually raise the wage, so the only credible wage increase would be
if firms are increasing the wage to a level that they would pay anyway in the
final period, absent incentive motives. We observe in the data that firms do pay
non-minimal, compensation in the final period, but at a modest level, presumably
reflecting pooling of worker types and a tradeoff for the firm between the value of
appealing to worker fairness motives and the need to protect against shirking by
selfish types. This particular final period wage puts an upper bound on the credible
wage increase going into the final period, and workers thus cannot expect a very
large wage increase at the end of the relationship. In earlier periods, firms must pay
even lower wages, so as to have room for gradual wage increases in response to good
performance by workers. In other treatments, the final period rent allows firms to
pay even higher wages in the pre-final period, thereby eliciting effort from fair types
(and imitating selfish types); in T-Barrier paying higher wages in the second-to-last
period does not work, because it will trigger immediate shirking; workers know that
the wage will not be increased, it cannot be lowered, and they cannot be fired. In
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effort from fair workers in pre-final periods, and may also be a neg-
ative signal for materially selfish agents about the likelihood of high
compensation in the future (see MacLeod and Malcomson (1998)). In
other treatments, firms are able to reward good performance by paying
high wages or bonuses from the outset, and we have seen empirically
that relationships beginning with higher compensation are more suc-
cessful in these treatments. While rising wage incentives are relatively
ineffective in the settings we consider, it is an interesting open question
how adding additional communication or reputation possibilities might
affect credibility of firms, and the relative performance of different in-
centive strategies.29
Another finding is that the option to pay bonuses causes firms to
be more “footloose”. The optimal degree of experimentation might
be greater with bonus pay, compared to settings where maintaining a
long-term relationship is more crucial for incentives. Looking at worker
effort choices, performance in one-shot interactions is better in T-Bonus
than in any of the other treatments, and the difference is statistically
significant. In this sense, it does appear that costs of experimentation
are lower with bonus pay.
The relative scarcity of occasions when firms re-hire a poorly per-
forming worker for a reduced wage, is consistent with much field evi-
dence that firms seldom cut worker wages, and that wage cuts may lead
to poor morale or even sabotage (Krueger and Mas (2004)). One expla-
nation may be that the level of previously offered compensation forms
a salient reference point, so that a reduction relative to this level is
viewed as a “loss”. Indeed, we observe that it is the relative comparison
to previous compensation that matters for shirking.
6. Conclusion
We use laboratory experiments to study the causal impact of differ-
ent market rules, which mimic institutional regimes observed in labor
markets, including dismissal barrier institutions and bonus pay. Our
results are consistent with a “Coasian” perspective, showing how a sin-
gle additional degree of contractual flexibility can be sufficient to allow
trading parties to largely avoid incentive problems caused by firing
summary, while the presence of fair agents could help make rising wages a credible
incentive device in T-Barrier, this would not be expected to generate very strong
incentives, or high enough compensation to elicit high effort from fair types.
29As long as settings involve effort being non-verifiable to third-parties, however, it
may be difficult for firms to establish reputations for following-through on effort-
contingent promises, as these are also by definition non-verifiable.
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costs. This point may be relevant for explaining why existing field ev-
idence on the impact of dismissal barriers is mixed (see, e.g., Ichino
and Riphan (2005); Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007) ; and others). Our
findings may also have some useful implications for discussion of the
regulation of European labor markets. Bentolila et al. (2012) highlight
the costs associated with having labor contracts that are restricted to
be either of short or long duration. The behavior in our experiments
suggests that discussion of regulation should include allowing economic
actors to experiment with contract forms that go beyond the simple
wage agreement.30
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